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International Migration, Ethnicity and Economic Inequality
*
 
While the allocative efficiency of mobility is typically considered to be positive but small in the 
long run, the induced changes in equality may be considerable in size. In practice, however, 
migrants typically improve their income position in comparison to those at home, stimulate 
the economic situation of the sending countries through remittances and rise the economic 
performance of natives and of capital in the host country through complementarities. The 
chapter suggests that at least skilled immigration promotes economic equality in the host 
country under standard conditions. The context is empirically documented und theoretically 
explained in a core model. Also, immigrant assimilation and selection is discussed, as is the 
role of ethnicity and ethnic identity for relative economic performance. 
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    "Our review of economic research finds immigrants not only help  
        fuel the Nation's economic growth, but also have an overall  
        positive effect on the income of native-born workers." 
    US  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  Chairman  Edward  P.  Lazear 
 
1. Introduction 
International and national migration is a momentous phenomenon driving the fortunes of large 
numbers of people.
1 The issue of labour flows is also an important part of any textbook in 
economics. Why do people move, and what happens to their welfare and that of the receiving and 
sending countries when they do? A widely accepted answer is that immigration helps to achieve a 
more efficient allocation of resources, and hence improves the welfare of nations. However, the rise 
in allocative efficiency is often considered to be fairly small.
2 The controversy starts with concerns 
about the distributional effects of immigration: (i) Is immigration detrimental, that is, do immigrants 
depress the wages and increase the unemployment of the natives, often enter into poverty within the 
receiving countries, and deprive the sending regions of their most motivated and talented workers? 
(ii) Is it possible that immigration is just not large and significant enough to cause such damage to 
be noticeable? Or: (iii) Is immigration de facto beneficial, because most empirical studies fail to 
identify any negative effects on the natives, immigrants are typically faring better in the receiving 
countries than at home, and the sending countries' population benefits from remittances and labour 
force from the induced scarcity in the home labour markets? And: (iv) What is actually the 
objective, equality among natives or among natives and immigrants together? 
  This chapter uses a well-defined setting to suggest an optimistic view about the 
distributional effects of immigration. We apply well-established concepts from the allocative debate 
to investigate the inequality issues, and extend the analysis to cover the role of ethnicity and ethnic 
                                                 
1 According to United Nations (UN) estimates, the share of international migrants in the total world population was 
2.4% in 1965, 2.3% in 1985 and reached 3.0% in 2005. In more developed regions, including Europe, Northern 
America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, the corresponding share reached 9.5% in 2005. See United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database. 
2 See Borjas (1999b) for equilibria situations. However, Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) have pointed out that the 
increase or decrease in allocative efficiency can be very large under particular disequilibrium conditions.   2
identity for the labour market. For the empirical part, we use data from the OECD countries. 
Conceptually, we adopt the "no-job, job, good job"-approach to the concept of economic inequality 
and the "unskilled-skilled paradigm" of labour migration. We study the issues of economic 
absorption (or assimilation) over time and across generations and consider selection through 
immigration and emigration choices and immigrant admission policies. We further deal with the 
impacts of ethnic identity on economic performance, and hence inequality. 
  Section 2 provides a general picture of the native-immigrant differences in labour force 
participation, unemployment, and occupational and educational attainment, controlled for skill 
levels and years since immigration. Section 3 investigates the inequality impact of immigration by 
summarizing the potential labour market impacts and the wage and employment consequences. 
Assuming immediate and full adjustment of immigrants, our stylized model suggest that skilled 
immigration is largely positive for the host economy, as inequality measured by the Gini coefficient 
improves with it for the most part. This model conjecture is supported by empirical evidence. 
Section 4 deals with the potentially slow integration of immigrants into the labour market of the 
host country, as well as with the role that self-selection and selection through politically set 
admission rules can play for the performance in the labour market. We also consider cultural or 
ethnic identity as an independent factor of economic success and discuss the consequences for 
inequality. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Some Empirical Facts 
The empirically measured association between inequality and the presence of immigrants in the 
economy reflects many aspects of mutual influence. On the on hand, migrants carry different 
amounts and forms of capital with them and represent different types of labour, thereby directly 
affecting the distribution of income in host societies. Furthermore, they have an indirect impact 
through changing the productivity of incumbent production factors as well as impinging on the 
redistributive policies in the host societies. On the other hand, different migrants select into   3
countries with different degrees of inequality. As shown in Table 1, New World countries with a 
high share of foreign-born population, such as the US or Australia, also have higher income 
inequality. Post-transition OECD country members, such as Poland or Slovakia, have very low 
shares of foreign population and low Gini coefficients. Western European countries are in between.  
  This comparison is misleading, however. The three groups of countries differ in terms of 
their economic institutions, redistribution policies, as well as the nature, type, and history of 
immigration. For example, the post-transition countries have low inequality and low shares of 
foreign population due to their history as closed command economies. The New World countries, at 
the other end of the spectrum, have a history of liberal immigration and economic policies. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to deal with these groups of countries separately to characterize the 
relationship between inequality and immigration.  
  In Figure 1 we therefore concentrate on European countries that share similar histories of 
immigration and economic institutions, focusing on the relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and the share of foreigners in the labour force. We observe no clear-cut relationship. In Figure 2, 
however, when we drop the outlier countries Luxembourg and Switzerland, the predicted values of 
a line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted regression of Gini values on the share of foreign 
labour suggest a distinct negative relationship. But such a finding could be affected by the quality 
composition of the foreign labour force. Only if it were the same across countries, one might safely 
predict declining inequality with rising shares of foreign labour. 
  Therefore, to identify some of the key mechanisms driving the relationship between 
immigration and labour market inequality we focus on three specific integration issues that govern 
the economic success of immigrants. First, labour market participation rates of the working age 
immigrant population characterize the economic activity of immigrants and their earnings 
prospects. Second, immigrants' unemployment rates mirror immigrants' chances of being employed 
and measure immigrants' earnings prospects conditional on their labour market participation. Third,   4
the occupational attainment of immigrants depicts immigrants' chances to obtain well-paid jobs, 
conditional on employment. 
  While a number of member states of the European Union
3 (EU) are still significantly behind 
the employment objectives stipulated in the Lisbon Agenda
4, the standing of immigrants is often 
even more adverse in many respects. This disparity suggests to use natives as a benchmark and to 
identify to what extent immigrants integrate in terms of their labour market outcomes and attain the 
Lisbon Agenda targets. There are a number of factors that determine individual economic 
attainment and drive the economic gap between immigrants and natives. Among these, perhaps the 
most significant one is human capital. Immigrants' labour market success is a function of their skills 
as well as the transferability of their skills into the new economic environment of the destination 
country. Furthermore, as immigrants face new incentives to adjust and invest in skills specific to 
their new economic environment, such as acquisition of language skills, the time that they have 
spent in the host country matters for their economic attainment.  
  We report here statistics for the working age population on labour market participation, 
unemployment and occupational attainment for the categories natives, immigrants with at least 10 
years of experience in the host country, immigrants in general, and three skill categories for both 
natives and immigrants pooled together defined as third (high), upper secondary (medium), and 
lower secondary (low) level of highest educational attainment.
5 We consider EU25 as a whole and 
the traditional European destination countries (EU15) separately to highlight some of the salient 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of the Lisbon strategy see Sapir et al. (2004), for instance. 
4 Set out in March 2000, the Lisbon Agenda of the EU stipulates, among other ambitious targets, that the overall 
employment rate and the female employment rate, which reflect the abovementioned participation and unemployment 
margins, should reach 70% and 60%, respectively, by 2010. 
5 Statistics are based on the EU Labour Force Survey 2005. High level of education includes ISCED 5 and 6 levels. 
ISCED 5 denotes first stage tertiary programmes having an educational content more advanced than those offered by 
secondary levels. They do not lead to the award of an advanced research qualification and must have a cumulative 
duration of at least two years. ISCED 6 denotes second stage tertiary education leading to an advanced research 
qualification and requiring original research contribution in the form of a thesis or dissertation. Medium level of 
education includes ISCED 3 and 4 levels, which denote education that typically begins at the end of full-time 
compulsory education and involves higher qualification and specialization than the ISCED 2 level. ISCED 3 level 
education is often designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5. ISCED 4 serve to broaden the knowledge achieved in 
ISCED 3 but are not regarded as tertiary. Low level of education includes ISCED 0, 1, and 2 levels. These include pre-  5
stylised patterns of immigrant-native labour market gaps and the role of human capital and 
adjustment in driving these gaps.
 6 
  Table 2 reports the participation rates. The rates of the natives vary between 45.29% in Italy 
and 78.45% in Sweden. In Netherlands and Sweden, the immigrants have fairly similar rates as the 
natives, although the natives rank first, followed by the immigrants with long-term presence and the 
immigrants in general. This is consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants need some time to 
assimilate to the labour market and to adjust to the natives' way of working or living. The numbers 
for Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg suggest the opposite: Immigrants have higher 
participation rates than natives, and these rates seem to be even higher for newcomers. This 
observation is consistent with the selection hypothesis, whereby it is the people with strong labour 
market potential, economic motives, and a desire to work who migrate. They only slowly adapt to 
the lower participation levels of the natives.  
  Another interpretation is based on cohort effects: In the 1960s and early 1970s immigrants 
in Western and Northern Europe were labour migrants selected to work through immigration 
policies. After the 1973 general halt on recruitment there were periods of political and refugee 
immigration as well as family-reunification, resulting in migrants with lower work incentives. 
Southern Europe and Ireland turned into immigration destination areas only in the last decade, 
where stronger growing economies and the opening of the Eastern Bloc were attracting larger 
numbers of labour immigrants. Such cohort effects may also explain the situation in Germany, the 
UK, France, and other countries where immigrants with long-term presence have lower 
participation rates than their recent counterparts (or natives). In these countries, however, 
immigrants are less active than the natives. This observation may reflect negative selection of 
immigrants to these countries. In Portugal, Greece, Finland, Denmark, and EU25 as a whole 
immigrants are more active than natives, especially if they have been in the respective economy for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
primary, primary, and lower secondary or second stage of primary education. The end of ISCED 2 often coincides with 
the end of compulsory schooling where it exists. For further details see UNESCO (1997).   6
more than 10 years. Such finding may be due to positive selection and beneficial effects of 
experience in the destination country, as discussed above.  
  A consistent picture across the columns of Table 2 is that educational levels and 
participation rates are positively associated. That is, more educated individuals exhibit much higher 
labour market participation rates than lower educated individuals. In general, immigrants in Europe 
are much less educated than in the US or Australia. In some European countries, this has been 
fostered for many decades by the immigration policies outlined above that had also focused on the 
immigration of blue-collar workers before the recession in 1973.  
  Table 3 contains the unemployment rates. The results here provide a clear-cut picture: 
Tenure in the country and education do matter; they are associated with lower unemployment rates.
7 
New immigrants have higher unemployment rates than natives and than those immigrants who are 
longer in the host country, which is consistent with the assimilation hypothesis of slow adaptation to 
the host labour market. In comparison to the natives, immigrants do particularly poorly in Belgium, 
Finland and Germany, and fairly well in Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.
8 Immigrants' 
unemployment rates are about the same as those of all the low educated for e.g. the EU25 and 
Spain, but substantially larger for Finland and the Netherlands. 
  Table 4 summarizes the occupational attainment of immigrants. Similarly to the 
participation picture, occupational attainment
9 exhibits a mixed pattern. While in most countries 
natives do significantly better than immigrants, in the UK and Portugal immigrants’ attainment is 
higher. Tenure in the destination country pays off especially in Spain, Ireland and Denmark, where 
it actually helps immigrants to outperform the natives. The occupational attainment of the low 
educated is below that of the immigrants, and close only in the case of Spain and Greece. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 EU denotes the 25 member states of the European Union in 2005 except for Malta for which no data is available. 
Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 and are not included. EU15 denotes the 15 member states prior to the 2004 
enlargement. 
7 The only exception is Greece, where experienced immigrants have higher unemployment than more recent immigrants. 
Nevertheless, natives do better than immigrants. 
8 Measured by the unemployment rate gap. 
9 At least rank 3 of the ISCO88 classification (1: Legislators, senior officials, and managers; 2: Professionals; 3: 
Technicians and associated professionals). For further details see ILO (1990).   7
  The educational composition of immigrants might explain the observed native-migrant 
labour market gaps. Table 5 provides only limited support for this conjecture. While immigrants are 
on average less educated than natives in some countries, including France and the Netherlands, in 
the EU25 as a whole and in a number of countries the evidence is less conclusive as the percentage 
of highly educated individuals is highest among immigrants. We can conjecture that the differences 
in education do not sufficiently explain differences in labour market outcomes between natives and 
immigrants. 
  Considering the other OECD countries, in the United States the foreign born population had 
a higher participation rates than the natives (67.7% against 65.8%) and lower unemployment rate 
(4.6% against 5.2%) in 2005.
10 This finding may reflect positive selection of immigrants into the 
US and the liberal institutions that reward active participation in the labour market. The evidence is 
fairly mixed in the post-transition OECD members, perhaps due to the short history of 
immigration.
11 While participation rates are for the most countries smaller for immigrants, the 
unemployment rates are higher in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, lower in Poland, and almost 
equal in Hungary. The Australian experience highlights the role of institutional immigrant selection 
mechanisms. Table 6 reveals that (i) tenure in Australia in general is positively associated with 
immigrants' participation and negatively with their unemployment rates, (ii) immigrants through 
streams that select on skills and economic aptitude perform better than those who came through 
other streams, and (iii) immigrants who faced more stringent immigration rules in 1999 and 2000 
perform better than the cohorts of the early 1990s. 
  The presented empirical observations suggest that immigrant adjustment is an important 
factor driving immigrants' labour market outcomes vis-à-vis the native population. While 
experience in the host society seems to reduce the observed gaps, it may also dissipate the positive 
effects of self-selection of economic immigrants on participation rates in some countries. The 
                                                 
10 The data are from the 2005 US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
11 We base this on unreported statistics from the 2005 EU Labour Force Survey.   8
changing composition of immigrant flows often due to policy changes may be another important 
factor driving the immigrant-native labour market gaps. While education is shown to be an 
important determinant of labour market outcomes, it does not seem to be the sole driver of the 
observed gaps. 
 
3. The Inequality Impact of Migration 
A Literature Review 
International flows of people fuel relocation of production factors and wealth attached to migrants 
and thus affect the allocation of the world income. Zlotnik (1999) and Chiswick and Hatton (2003) 
report that migrant flows to the developed countries have increasingly involved migrants from less 
developed countries. Besides the effects on the international world income inequality, these 
migration flows affect intra-national income distribution in sending and receiving countries.  
  The literature on the effects of emigration on various measures of inequality in sending rural 
areas of poor countries dates back to Lipton (1977), who argues that such emigration increases 
interpersonal and inter-household inequality within and between rural villages. A number of studies 
addressing this issue in national and international settings, such as Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki 
(1986, 1988), Taylor (1992), Adams (1989, 1992), Lipton (1980), Stahl (1982), Barham and 
Boucher (1998) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006), portray a mixed picture, where the direction of 
these effects depends on applied methodologies, type of migration, and stages of the studied 
migration histories. To illustrate, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) found that remittances from 
emigrants assuage income inequality in a Mexican village with an extensive experience of 
emigration to the US. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) examine the sensitivity of the estimated 
positive effect of remittances from the US on a Mexican village using an extended Gini index of 
inequality. They find that this effect decreases as incomes of people at the bottom of the distribution 
are assigned higher weights. In contrast, Adams (1989) finds that remittances increased inequality 
in three Egyptian villages comparing the actual migration history to the no migration counterfactual.   9
Replicating the study for four Pakistani villages, he finds neutral effects (Adams, 1992), however. 
Barham and Boucher (1998), find that migration reduces inequality assuming exogeneity of 
remittances, while finding the opposite effects when endogeneity of remittances is accounted for.  
  The impact of immigration on the destination labour market has been modelled by a number 
of studies, including Chiswick, Chiswick and Karras (1992) and Chiswick (1980, 1998). In these 
models, the effects of migration on income inequality in receiving countries largely depend on the 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the immigrant and native populations as 
manifested by the substitutability or complementarity of their labour. Concerning the empirical 
evidence, for the US, Grossman (1982) finds that foreign-born workers are substitutes for native 
workers and Borjas (1983) reveals complementarity between Black and Hispanic labour and 
Hispanic and White male workers. Borjas (1987a) provides some evidence that White, Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian immigrant male workers are substitutes for Whites born in the US. All these 
studies report effects of small magnitudes.  
  However, more recent studies provide evidence of diverse and non-negligible labour market 
effects of immigration. Using data from the 1990 US census, Card (2001) distinguishes the effects 
of immigration for various occupational groups and finds significant negative employment effects 
in most cases. In a similar study, Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) find negative wage effects of 
immigration on unskilled natives but do not find significant effects in skilled occupations. Borjas, 
Freeman and Katz (1997) report that immigration explains a significant proportion of the increase in 
the wage gap between high and low skill labour in the US in the 1980s and early 1990s. Negative 
wage effects of immigrants on their co-ethnics in the same linguistic group are reported by 
Chiswick and Miller (2002). Borjas (1999b, 2003, 2006) and Filler (1992) provide further evidence 
on the negative effects of immigration in the US. In a natural experiment setting of the Mariel 
boatlift which brought an influx 45,000 Cubans into Miami in 1980, Card (1990) finds that any 
effects of unexpected immigration were cancelled out by mobility response of natives and former 
immigrants.    10
  Considering the international evidence, Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) find only 
small negative effects of immigration on German employment. Hunt (1992) studied the impact of 
the Algerian repatriates on the French labour market after the Algerian independence and found 
detrimental but only weak wage and employment effects for the natives. Similarly, Carrington and 
de Lima (1996) find some evidence of negative effects on native wages of refugees from the lost 
colonies in Portugal. Angrist and Kugler (2003) report negative effects of immigration from former 
Yugoslavia on employment in Europe, especially in countries with more restrictive market 
institutions. Also Roy (1987) reports detrimental effects of immigration on native employment 
prospects in Canada. However, no negative effects of immigration on employment are reported by 
Pischke and Velling (1997) for Germany, Akbari and DeVoretz (1992) for Canadian natives, 
Dustmann, Fabbai, and Preston (2005) in the case of the UK, and Addison and Worwick (2002) for 
Australian natives. Roy (1997) reports no clear patterns of substitutability or complementarity 
between foreign- and Canadian-born labour. Friedberg (2001) finds no negative effects of Russian 
immigration on Israeli wages or employment. Zorlu and Hartog (2005) report little effects of 
immigration on native wages for the Netherlands, U.K and Norway. On the positive side, Chapman 
and Cobb-Clark (1999) and Parasnis, Fausten and Smyth (2006) find positive effects of immigration 
on the employment prospects of Australian natives. De New and Zimmermann (1994) support the 
complementarity hypothesis by finding negative effects of (largely unskilled) immigration on the 
wages of the German unskilled but positive wage effects on the wages of native high-skilled. 
  These interactions between immigrants and natives determine how immigrants fare across 
the earnings distribution in host societies. This issue has been addressed by a significant body of 
literature, including Borjas (1990, 1995) that focus on mean immigrant-native earnings gaps and 
Butcher and DiNardo (2002) and Chiswick, Le and Miller (2008) who investigate this gap at 
different deciles of earnings distribution. This literature generally reports significant earnings gaps 
whose magnitudes and determinants vary by gender, year and immigrant cohort as well as across 
the deciles of the earnings distribution. Employment gaps between immigrants and natives in the   11
US labour market are documented by Chiswick, Cohen and Zach (1997) among others. Borjas 
(1986) reports higher self-employment rates among immigrants than natives. Gaps in various 
measures of labour market outcomes of immigrants and natives in other developed countries are 
reported by a number of studies, including Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) for Spain, 
Constant and Massey (2003) for Germany and Wheatly Price (1999) and Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston 
and Wadsworth (2003) for the UK. 
  One of the main determinants of this variation is the composition of immigrant inflows and 
the (self-)selection of immigrants. Another important aspect of immigrants’ labour market success 
in the host society is the transferability of these skills to the host society. Dustmann, Frattini and 
Preston (2007) provide evidence that immigrants temporarily downgrade to less skilled occupations 
than they are qualified for due to incomplete transferability of their skills upon arrival. We further 
discuss the issues of selection and adaptation in Section 4. 
The book edited by Zimmermann (2005b) contains 15 chapters for European countries and 
the US, Canada and New Zealand summarizing migration experiences since the Second World War. 
The conclusion obtained is that immigration is largely beneficial for the receiving countries. There 
can be phases of adjustment, but there is no overall evidence that natives' wages are strongly 
depressed or that unemployment is substantially increasing as a consequence of immigration. 
However, the labour market integration of immigrants has been slow, but steady, and their impact 
on the natives in total has not been very strong, but mostly beneficial. However, with globalization 
and the particular pressure on low-skilled workers and the rising demand for the high skilled, the 
observed patterns are changing. Most important, the economic position of the new immigrants has 
become weaker. A selective immigration policy seems to be even more important than before. 
 
A Stylized Model of the Labour Market Impacts of Immigration 
This section provides a simple theoretical setting to investigate the impacts of labour migration on 
the economy of the host country. Let us start with a very simple economy where labour is   12
homogenous and capital is the only other production factor. Then, the standard textbook model 
using a competitive market framework is illustrated in Figure 3 with a fixed labour supply and a 
downward sloping labour demand curve. Denoting the quantity of labour L and the wage level w, 
the equilibrium values are w
0 for the wage and 
0 L  for employment. Additional employed workers 
(or immigrants) of size AB depress the wage level down to w1. They migrate because they receive 
higher wages than at home (their income is the rectangle 
0 L
1 L AB), and are better off. Pre-
migration labour loses the rectangle ADw
0w
1 to capital, which also takes the total welfare gain for 
the economy, ABD. However, wages may not be downward flexible, perhaps due to restrictions 
established by unions.
12 Then immigration may cause unemployment at a maximum of AB, given 
we started at full employment. Gains by immigrants and capital are thus associated with either 
lower wages, higher unemployment or both, depending on the degree of wage flexibility. This is 
often the picture behind the public debate about the impact of labour immigration. 
  Extending this simple equilibrium framework to the immigrants' countries of origin, the 
response there is symmetric: capital loses at first at the expense of labour. The countries of origin 
will further gain from parts of 
0 L
1 L AB in the form of remittances. Migration, therefore, helps to 
reduce inequality across the world. We also learn that, if migrants stay, they become first 
immigrants and then even citizens, and this may change the calculation of inequality measures: At 
what stage do immigrants count in the evaluation of inequality, and how? Do the gains of capital 
justify redistribution efforts to compensate labour and to share the welfare gain ABD fairly? 
  As suggested above, there might be a union wage equal to w
0, imposing a threat of 
unemployment of level AB. However, in the face of competitive international markets with labour, 
capital, and technologies, unions might be under substantial pressure to reduce the union wage and 
allow the welfare gain to occur.  
                                                 
12 See Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann (1994) for a theoretical treatment of this issue.   13
  A further and important issue is that the assumption of an invariant labour demand curve 
during the phase of immigration might be unfounded. This curve might shift due to migrants’ 
additional demand for goods, the inflow of capital, or both. Assume that immigrants are 
economically identical to natives upon arrival, they are perfectly assimilated in the labour market 
and supply the same labour and bring the same amount of capital per person as the natives. A strict 
neoclassical world with a constant returns production function would then lead to point C with a 
shift in the labour demand function, full employment and additional production equal to the 
rectangle w
0DC all absorbed by the immigrants. Native labour and capital would both receive zero 
gains (or losses), since their parameters would remain unchanged. Immigrants, therefore, need to be 
"different" to have an economic impact. 
  As we have seen in Section 2, an important part of reality is that labour is heterogeneous, 
which brings the analysis to a different level. Immigration typically involves inflows of people who 
are on average more or less skilled than the native workers. As a result, it has important 
consequences for the distribution of skills in the economy. Furthermore, it affects the equilibria in 
the markets for skilled and unskilled labour and thus the distribution of income in the economy. To 
highlight the mechanisms that drive the effects of immigration on the host economy and to provide 
a powerful analytical instrument to study these mechanisms it is sufficient to concentrate on two 
types of labour only, the skilled S and the unskilled L.
13 Therefore, we make a simplifying 
assumption that immigrant and native labour is homogenous within skill categories, which we relax 
in Section 4.  
  In line with standard production functions and empirical evidence, we can assume that 
skilled and unskilled workers are complements.
14 We also assume for simplicity that the output 
price is constant. The key issues for the evaluation of the wage and employment effects of 
                                                 
13 We use the terms skilled and educated interchangeably to describe workers’ level of human capital. We, however, 
recognize the difference between the two terms; skills being the result of the learning process involving formal 
education as well as experience and practice, while education referring to the time spent in formal educational 
institutions. Thus, while in the theoretical part we prefer to use the broader term skills, in the empirical part we use the 
available measures on education.   14
immigrant labour are then (i) whether the new workers are substitutes or complements to skilled or 
unskilled natives and (ii) what the equilibrium conditions are in the markets for skilled and 
unskilled labour in the host country. The first issue is about the share of skilled persons among the 
stock of immigrant workers, which is driven by immigration policies and self-selection. The answer 
to the second issue provides information whether both markets can be considered to be in a 
competitive equilibrium (as in the US) or the markets are in excess supply of low-skilled workers 
and in equilibrium or excess demand for the high skilled (as in Europe). Whichever the case, skilled 
immigration reduces the wages of skilled people and increases wages and employment of the un-
skilled. Hence, skilled immigration is "good" not only in an allocative sense (it provides an increase 
of general welfare as in the homogenous labour case), but it also improves equality in a heuristic 
sense. The "poor" fair better while the "rich" get less. For unskilled immigration we find the reverse 
situation. 
  Let us first illustrate the situation for unskilled immigration by use of Figure 4. While the 
labour market of the skilled is characterized by competitive conditions and equilibrium A
0, we find 
a union wage 
0
l w  higher than the equilibrium wage 
1
l w  in the market for unskilled labour. This has 
generated unemployment at level 
0 L - L
0 for the unskilled in the partial equilibrium B
0. Then an 
inflow of unskilled migrant workers may just cause additional unemployment of size 
1 L -
0 L , and 
nothing will happen in the market for skilled labour either. The economic position of the (poor) 
unskilled will deteriorate, however. Only if the union wage declines in the face of the additional 
competition from the immigrants, and the wage falls from w0 to w1, will this lead to more unskilled 
employment and through complementarity also to a higher demand for skilled workers. 
Consequently, wages of the high-skilled move up from 
0
h w to 
1
h w  from equilibrium point A
0 to A
1. 
This effect is the stronger the more competitive is the market for unskilled labour. In sum, rising 
unemployment or falling wages for the poor (or both) and rising wages for the skilled workers mark 
                                                                                                                                                                  
14 See Hamermesh (1993).   15
a reduction in the relative economic position of the poor, and provide an indication of increasing 
inequality.
15 
  The evaluation of the immigration of skilled workers is even more obvious. The rise in the 
stock of skilled workers (see the shift in the supply curve from 
0 S  to 
1 S  in Figure 5a) moves the 
equilibrium point down from C
0 to C
1. The demand for unskilled workers increases due to 
complementarity (see the shift of the demand curve in Figure 5b) and under a competitive unskilled 
market, unskilled wages rise from 
2
l w  to 
3
l w  at the full employment level L . Under a rigid union 




1) or not (D
0
 to D
2) the union wage decreases to 
1
l w . Due to the complementarity of 
skilled and unskilled labour, the implied rise in unskilled employment (L
0 to L
2 or L
1) causes an 
upward shift of the demand for skilled workers and partly counteracts the original wage decline, 
raising the skilled wage from 
1
h w  to 
2
h w . Hence, immigration of skilled labour is likely to cause a 
decline in skilled wages and a rise in unskilled employment, and in the case of a competitive 
equilibrium in the unskilled market, also a rise in low-skilled wages. This provides a strong 
rationale for the conjecture that skilled immigration reduces inequality. 
 
High-skilled Immigration Decreases Inequality 
We further investigate this issue in an analytical labour market model that relates inequality to skill 
composition of the labour force and then explicate its predictions for the inequality effects of 
migration. Consider an economy of size one with L low-skilled and  1 SL = −  high-skilled workers 
earning wages  l w  and  h w , respectively.
16 The graphical representation of the Gini coefficient as a 
measure of inequality in this economy is quite straightforward. Figure 6 plots the share of income 
accruing to the λ  poorest individuals in the economy, where we normalize income to unity, 
                                                 
15 In practice it is often difficult to provide evidence of negative effects of unskilled immigration. This might have to do 
with the facts that immigrants provide different types of services and talents than even unskilled natives so that they are 
complements to both skilled and unskilled natives.   16
( ) 11 lh wL w L +− = , and order individuals from the poorest to the most affluent. The Gini 
coefficient is the area between the line of perfect equality, the 45 degree line, and the Lorenz curve 
( ) z λ , depicting the share of economy’s income accruing to the λ  poorest individuals, divided by 
the area between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality. The line of perfect 
inequality attains zero for any  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ λ  and  ( ) 11 z = . Given the assumptions above, if the economy 
starts at point A the Gini coefficient is calculated as the size of the triangle 0A1 divided by the 
triangular area below the line of perfect equality, 01. The slopes of the lines 0A and A1 are 
( ) ( )
11 1 LL θθ+−  and  ( ) ( )
11 11 LL θ +− , respectively, where  lh ww θ = .  
  How does the Gini coefficient change when wages or skill composition in the economy 
change? Consider an increase in the relative wage θ , that might occur with an inflow of highly 
skilled migrants who depress the relative wages of the skilled natives. We still hold L constant at L
1 
in this analysis, assuming for the moment that our population of interest for measuring inequality 
are the incumbent natives only. Increasing θ  increases the slope of the Lorenz curve for 
1 0,L λ ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ 
and decreases it for 
2,1 L λ ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ , such that the economy moves to point B. Clearly, the triangle 0B1 
is smaller than 0A1 and Gini coefficient decreases, indicating a decrease in inequality. The effects 
of an increase in the share of low-skilled workers from L
1 to L
2, holding wages constant at the 
original level, has more intricate effects, as it is not obvious how the triangles 0A1 and 0C1 
compare.  
  We tackle these issues analytically. We show in the Appendix that the Gini coefficient for a 













.              ( 1 )  
Differentiating it with respect to the wage ratio, we obtain  
                                                                                                                                                                  














,            ( 2 )  
which is always negative for admissible values of L and θ, thus confirming the geometric analysis 
in Figure 6. Differentiating the Gini coefficient with respect to L and assuming exogenous wages, 
we obtain  












.            ( 3 )  
It follows that the sign of  ( ) dG L dL is determined by the sign of  ( ) ( ) 121 LL θ −−− , which is 
positive within the range  [ ] 0,1 L∈  whenever  ( ) 11 L θ <+, zero for  ( ) 11 L θ =+, and negative 
otherwise.
17 Thus, in Figure 6 the triangle 0C1 is larger than 0A1 if  ( ) 11 L θ <+ holds and 
smaller if it does not. Noting that  ( ) 1 1 1 5 . 0 < + < θ  for any ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ θ ,  ( ) GL attains a maximum for 
some  () 1 , 5 . 0 ∈ L  and thus  () GL is increasing on the larger part of the admissible range of L. Figure 
7 shows how  ( ) GL might look like as a function of the share of skilled labour in the case of 
exogenous wages, where L
0 denotes the level of  ( ) 11 L θ =+.  
  Figure 8 illustrates the effects of immigration on the economy for an exogenously given 
wage ratio, as might be the case in some Western European countries with strong union regulation. 
For example, an inflow of immigrants who are on average more skilled than the natives lowers L in 
the economy. If the share of low skill workers in the economy is low and/or the wage gap is large 
such that  ( ) 11 L θ <+, this decrease in L decreases inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
This is the case in the upper right triangle in Figure 8. The inflow of low-skilled immigrants that 
increases L has corresponding converse effects.
18 
                                                 
17 See the Appendix for the derivation of these properties. 
18 The effects on the source countries are the mirror image of those on the destination countries.   18
  Let us now investigate the effects of immigration on inequality in a more realistic setup, 
relaxing the assumption of exogenous wages. We let  ( ) L θθ =  and, for the sake of simplicity, 
consider a specific case with the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function 
() ()
1
1 1 1 CL S
ρ ρ ρ α
− − − =+ , where  ε ρ 1 =  and  0 ε >  is the (finite) elasticity of substitution of high- 
and low-skilled labour in a competitive industry and  1 α >  is the efficiency shift factor of skilled 




=−  and the earnings of an 
unskilled relative to a skilled worker are θ α . We first consider the natural case where the earnings 
of high-skilled workers are higher than those of low-skilled ones,  1 θ α < . In the Appendix we 
show that the Gini coefficient in the case is 
()
















         ( 4 )  
and that there is a nondegenerate range 
12 LL within the interval [0,1] where  ( ) GL is increasing in 
L. In fact, whenever  ( ] 0,1 ε ∈ ,  ( ) 0 dG L dL >  for any  ( ) 0,1 L∈ . For  1 ε > ,  ( ) GL is increasing 
within and decreasing outside of 
12 LL, that is, for very low and very high values of L. It turns out 
that the range 
12 LL tends to be quite large.
19 Parametric values determine which  ( ) 0,1 L∈  are 
admissible with respect to the condition  1 θ α <  and which are not. We denote 
* L  the value of L at 
which  1 θ α = . One can show that  ( )
*1 1 1 1 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+ , 
1*2 LLL < < , and  1 θ α <  for any 
()
*,1 LL ∈  and  1 θ α >  for any  ( )
* 0, L L ∈ .
20 It turns out that for the values of  ( )
* 0, LL ∈  the Gini 
coefficient equals  ( ) GL − . How the Gini coefficient might look like as a function of the share of 
                                                 
19 For example, if the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labour is about 2.5, as estimated by Chiswick (1978C), and  
high skilled labour is twice as productive as its low skilled counterpart, the corresponding values are 
1 0.07 L =  and  
2 0.83 L = .   19
skilled labour, 1-L, in case of flexible wages is shown in Figure 7.
21 Note that for OECD economies 
with a large share of skilled labour the relevant segment of  ( ) GL is decreasing in 1-L for the most 
part and may pick up for  ( )
* 0, LL ∈ , where, counterfactually, the low-skilled earn more than the 
high-skilled. 
  This result enables us to consider the effects of changes in L that occur when immigrants of 
different skill composition (vis-à-vis the natives) enter (leave) the economy under the conditions of 
flexible wages. In Figure 9 the arrows indicate the effects of immigration on inequality in the 
economy, for various combinations of shares of skilled and unskilled labour among the natives and 
immigrants. For example, in the upper central trapezoid for  ( )
*2 , LL L ∈  an inflow of immigrants 
who are on average more skilled than the natives decreases inequality in the economy.
22  
  To summarize, theory predicts that skilled immigration decreases inequality in advanced 
economies such as the OECD countries where skilled labour is abundant. Accounting for the 
endogeneity of wages confirms this result, predicting that inequality is decreasing with skilled 
immigration for moderate to high values and may be increasing for very high values of the share of 
skilled labour, 1-L. We examine this theoretical result empirically in the next section. 
 
The Gini Coefficient and the Educated Labour Force 
As discussed in the previous section, theory predicts a negative relationship between inequality and 
the share of skilled labour in the labour force, which is itself a function of immigrants’ skills, for 
advanced economies where skilled labour is abundant. We, therefore, analyze here the empirical 
relationship between inequality and educational attainment levels in the labour force.
23 We combine 
                                                                                                                                                                  
20 See Zimmermann and Kahanec (2008a). Note, that if  1 ε >  ( ( ) 0,1 ε ∈ ), it must be that  0.5 L <  ( 0.5 L > ) for 
1 θ α <  to hold. 
* 0.26 L =  under the assumptions of the previous footnote. 
21 In Figure 7 we consider the possibility that  1 ε > . If  ( ] 0,1 ε ∈ ,  ( ) GL is decreasing over the whole range and the 
Gini coefficient thus exhibits a V-shaped curve on  ( ) 0,1 L∈ . 
22 Note that we consider the case  1 ε >  in the figure. 
23 As mentioned earlier, education measures a certain type of skills.   20
data on education, labour force characteristics and other national indicators from the OECD 
Statistical Compendium 2007 with the Gini measures reported in the World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID  2007) version 2.0b compiled by the WIDER institute at the United Nations 
University and published in May 2007. The OECD Statistical Compendium provides historical 
statistics on a wide range of economic variables, such as labour force characteristics, national 
accounts, and education, mainly for developed countries that are members of OECD.  
  The WIID 2007 dataset reports Gini coefficients for a large number of countries covering 
many years of collection and estimation of this inequality indicator. In those cases where WIID 
2007 reports multiple Gini coefficients per year and country, we prefer those of the highest quality 
if based on gross rather than net takings and earnings rather than broader measures of income to 
quantify those components of economic inequality that stem from the labour market as precisely as 
possible.
24 The combined dataset covers 29 OECD member states and provides 158 (154) 
observations with non-missing information on the Gini coefficient the shares of the labour force 
with at least upper secondary (post-secondary) education. 
  Figures 10 and 11 plot the Gini coefficient against the shares of educated labour at work 
measured by the abovementioned variables. We observe a U-shaped relationship that is downward 
sloping for the most part of the observed data. To investigate the properties of these relationships 
more precisely, we compute the predicted values of a locally smoothed regression of the Gini 
coefficient on the measures of educational attainment in the labour force. The plots in Figures 12 
and 13 confirm the U-shaped character of the observed relationships. In fact, these relationships are 
not too different from simple quadratic fits. These figures confirm that both relationships are 
negative for the most part. Indeed, this relationship is negative for about 80% of the observations in 
                                                 
24 It needs to be acknowledged that whether earnings inequality is measured at the individual or household level is a 
non-trivial issue in the context of measuring the relationship between inequality and immigration. In particular, 
immigrants often have larger households and different family structures than natives. As a result, measures of inequality 
based on individual and household earnings may give different pictures of inequality. The analysis of this  complex 
relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter, however. Nevertheless, we control for the level (individual vs. 
household) at which the Gini coefficient was measured in our empirical analysis.       21
case of post secondary or higher education. The corresponding percentage for upper secondary or 
higher education is about 60%. 
  However, there are factors other than the distribution of educational levels in the labour 
market that may influence this relationship. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that 
increased demand for skilled workers and females as well as changes in the allocation of labour 
between industries contributed to increasing inequality in the US in recent years. Gustafsson and 
Johansson (1999) find that the share of industry in employment, per capita gross domestic product, 
international trade, the relative size of the public expenditures, as well as the demographic structure 
of the population affect inequality measured by the Gini coefficient across countries and years. 
Topel (1994) provides evidence that technological and economic development determine economic 
inequality. 
  To examine whether the observed decreasing and U-shaped relationship is robust with 
respect to the possible covariates mentioned in the literature, we tested its stability using the OLS 
model and the same dataset and variables as above. As potential covariates we considered aggregate 
and female labour force participation rates, aggregate and female unemployment rates, share of the 
population between 15 and 64 years of age, labour force in the agricultural sector, share of the 
government in the economy, gross domestic product and inflation rate, as well as a number of 
controls for the character and quality of the data on Gini coefficient, year, and country. A regression 
analysis by Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008) confirms that the observed decreasing and U-shaped 
relationship is robust and significant over a number of model specifications, including models with 
weighing by data quality and country size, clustering, and random and fixed country effects. The 
estimated coefficients predict the minimum of the U-shaped relationship between the share of 
skilled labour and the Gini coefficient to lie at about 75% of the labour force with upper secondary 
or higher education and 65% of the labour force with post secondary or higher education. In our 
sample these numbers imply a downward sloping relationship between the share of skilled labour   22
and inequality for about 62% and 83% of the observations for the two applied measures of skilled 
labour, respectively. 
 
4. Immigrant Absorption, Selection and Ethnicity 
Demand, Supply and Policy Measures 
There are many channels through which immigration affects the host economy. Immigration brings 
in new people with diverse characteristics and economic aptitudes, it affects the economic prospects 
of the native population and it impinges on the decisions of important economic and policy actors. 
The labour market status of immigrants is a principal measure of immigrants' success in the 
destination economy. After proper adaptation to the host country, immigrants can fully utilize their 
skills, possibly turning from low into high-skilled labour. As shown in the previous section, the skill 
level of immigrants affects inequality. Therefore, the degree of immigrants' labour market 
assimilation are in turn an important determinant of economic inequality in the host society.  
  Immigrant selection is one approach to react to concerns about the absorption process of 
immigration based on clear admission criteria and immigration policies (Zimmermann, 2005a, 
2005b; Constant and Zimmermann, 2005) for an evaluation of immigration policies across 
countries.) Constant and Zimmermann (2005) aim to understand the role of the legal status of the 
migrant at the time of entry in the host country (work permit, refugee, and kinship) on work 
participation and earnings using individual survey data for Denmark and Germany. Their research 
suggests that non-economic migrants are less qualified for the labour market and exhibit lower 
earnings even having controlled for skill-level. Arriving through family reunion or as asylum 
seekers or refugees affects paid-employment earnings negatively in both Germany and Denmark. 
However, while the effect is about the same size for both groups in Denmark, the refugee/asylum 
status is more harmful in Germany than the family reunion status. Individuals arriving with a work 
status in Germany are more likely to earn less when changing to self-employment than when 
arriving through another channel. These estimates suggest that there are long-lasting effects of the   23
legal status at entry in the country on the earnings potential of immigrants. Hence, a selective 
immigration policy might be helpful in ensuring the attraction of more talented individuals. 
  There is some confusion about how to study immigrant absorption into the host country's 
society and economy. Economists typically have discussed "assimilation" as the process where (i) 
immigrant earnings each year comes closer to the earnings of an equivalent native (Chiswick, 1978) 
or (ii) among two observationally equivalent immigrants the one with the longer presence in the 
host country earns more (LaLonde and Topel, 1992, p. 75). As Borjas (1999a, p. 1721) has pointed 
out, it is important to stress in the analysis what the relevant reference group is. In our context it is 
important to deal with the question how immigrants become economically like natives. They might 
earn less upon arrival, but converge with time spend in the country after adapting to the host 
country labour market. This economic absorption, however, does not have to be complemented by 
cultural absorption, that is ethnic identity of the immigrant might evolve separately and exhibit an 
independent effect on economic performance. We, therefore, distinguish here between economic 




The pioneering work of Chiswick (1978) investigates the economic assimilation of immigrants 
defined as earnings parity between immigrants and natives and their age earning profiles in a cross 
sectional setting. The typical pattern observed in cross-sectional data features three distinct 
attributes. First, upon arrival, immigrants' earnings are significantly below those of natives, holding 
observable skills constant. This finding is typically ascribed to immigrants' lack of certain 
unobservable skills, non-transferability of their skills, and their lack of information specific to the 
host economy, including language, educational qualifications, and general information about the 
                                                 
25 According to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary assimilation is "the process whereby individuals or groups of differing 
ethnic heritage are absorbed into the dominant culture of a society."   24
host labour market. Second, with experience in the host economy, however, immigrants acquire the 
missing skills and information and catch up with the natives.  
  Finally, the evidence in the US is that after a certain period of converging to the native level 
of earnings, immigrants seem to earn more than natives. The standard human capital model does not 
offer simple explanations of this finding. The typical explanation offered by economists is selection, 
the innate (unobservable) ability of immigrants and their drive and determination to succeed in the 
new country. Since the decision to migrate involves weighing the costs and benefits of migration, 
people with stronger economic prospects in the destination economy are more likely to migrate and, 
therefore, after a period of adjustment on average outperform the representative native population.  
  The cross sectional analysis could thus explain why immigrants who migrated in the more 
distant past earn more than their more recent counterparts. However, the cross sectional data may 
hide certain cohort effects as argued by Borjas (1985). In particular, more recent immigrants can be 
inherently different to those who arrived some years ago. If these more recent arrivals are 
unobservably less skilled than the older cohorts, cross sectional data cannot distinguish these cohort 
effects from the assimilation hypothesis described above. Cohort effects may be driven by changes 
in the immigration policy of the host country or by institutional and political changes in the source 
countries. For example, refugees from the Soviet Bloc to Germany were typically highly skilled 
professionals. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, migration barriers were lessened and a 
much more varied sample of people decided to migrate to the West. 
  The empirical evidence on the cohort effects suggests that these effects may be quite large.
26 
Borjas (1995) provides evidence that the educational attainment of immigrant cohorts in the US 
declined by 1.8 years of schooling between 1960 and 1990 and that the age-earnings profiles of the 
1950-59 cohort are higher than those of the 1970-79 cohort throughout the life cycle. In particular, 
while the earlier cohort's age-earnings profiles are above those of the natives, the more recent 
                                                 
26 Borjas (1994) surveys the early literature.   25
immigrants' profiles are inferior to the natives'. These cohort effects suggest that more recent 
arrivals will hardly assimilate and never fully catch up with the natives.  
  Figure 14 plots the hypothetical age-earnings profiles of two immigrant cohorts and the 
natives. According to the assimilation hypothesis, the early cohort of immigrants quickly catches up 
with the natives surpassing them after some adjustment time. On the other hand, the more recent 
immigrant cohort has poor labour market characteristics that drive their age-earnings profiles below 
those of the natives and the earlier immigrant cohort throughout the lifecycle and no assimilation 
occurs. 
  Immigrant assimilation has important consequences for inequality in the host economy. 
Under the assimilation hypothesis, immigration affects earnings inequality in the host economy in 
two ways. First, fresh immigrants earn below average wages and thus increase the number of low- 
paid workers. After a certain assimilation period, however, positively selected immigrants earn 
more than the average native and thus increase the number of high-paid workers. Given our earlier 
theoretical results, if immigrants first behave as low-skilled and then, after an adjustment period, as 
high-skilled, immigration eventually lowers earnings inequality. The exact magnitude of this effect 
is importantly determined by the speed of the assimilation process. The cohort effect hypothesis, on 
the other hand, predicts that immigration invariably contributes to the number of low-pay workers 
and that these effects are invariant over time and immigrants' life cycle. 
  The literature has identified a single most important factor driving the declining relative 
skills across immigrant waves: the changing composition of immigrants as concerns their country of 
origin.
27 For the US, Borjas (1990) reports a significant shift of the composition of new arrivals, 
Latin American and Asian immigrants replacing those of European origin. The relatively facile 
transferability of human capital between developed countries as compared to the transfer from less 
developed to developed countries and the abovementioned increase in the share of immigrants from 
                                                 
27 Chiswick (1999) discusses the theoretical approaches to self-selection, noting that especially migrants whose main 
reason to migrate are economic opportunities tend to be favourably self-selected.   26
less developed countries explains why more recent immigrants have lower skills. The higher 
opportunity costs of migration in high-GDP countries leading to selection of only immigrants with 
the best economic prospects further elucidates why immigrants from less developed countries are 
less skilled. 
  This selection argument can be extended to different skill groups within and between source 
countries.
28 The character of the earnings distribution in the source country affects the migration 
incentives of high and low skill workers differently. In a country that has a relatively flat earnings 
distribution the opportunity costs of migration are higher for the low skilled workers who enjoy 
wealth redistribution in their favour. On the other hand, in a country with a relatively steep income 
distribution it is the high skilled who enjoy high returns to skills and have high opportunity costs of 
migration (Borjas, 1985). As a result, we can expect that high-skill (low-skill) migrants will move 
from countries that have a flatter (steeper) income distribution than the destination country. The 
logic of this argument can easily be explained using the Roy model.
29 Consider people in the source 
country making their migration decision based on the expected wage in the source and destination 
countries. Assume that earnings are determined solely by individual skills such that  
s ss ws α γ =+              ( 5 )  
dd d ws α γ =+             ( 6 )  
where  w denotes wages, α  is the shift factor and γ  denotes the returns to skills s . Subscripts s  
and d  denote the source and destination country, respectively. The migration decision is illustrated 
in Figure 15. Panel a) depicts skill-earnings profiles (1) and (2) in the situation where the source 
country is more egalitarian than the destination country. After the break even point bp migration 
becomes an attractive option and immigrants are positively selected on skills. In panel b), on the 
other hand, it is the destination country that is relatively more egalitarian and bp marks the break 
even point of skill-driven negative migrant selection. According to this model, it is not the average   27
income level in the source and destination country that drive skill-based selection of migrants. 
Rather, it is the relative distribution of income.
30 
  The Roy model has important implications for income distribution in the source and 
destination countries as a function of immigrants' self-selection. It predicts that the more (less) 
egalitarian the destination country is, the higher the likelihood that it attracts low (high) skill 
immigrants. In effect, egalitarian (non-egalitarian) destination countries are prone to earnings 
inequality with a concentration of immigrants at the lower (upper) tail of the earnings distribution. 
On the other hand, egalitarian (non-egalitarian) source countries are likely to experience an uneven 
distribution of earnings with a thin upper (lower) tail. 
  These distributional aspects highlight the role of immigration policy for earnings inequality 
between and within immigrant and native groups in the host society. Focusing on Europe and 
Germany and Denmark in particular, Constant and Zimmermann (2005) provide evidence that these 
countries could benefit from more pro-active policies aiming at recruitment and integration of 
immigrants with strong economic prospects. An example of such policy is selection of qualified 
immigrants using observable and measurable criteria. Such policies would lower the shares of 
immigrants with inferior economic aptitude in the host economy. Depending on the selection 
criteria, such polices have a solid potential to reduce income inequality and immigrant poverty in 
the destination countries. 
  
Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity 
Ethnic identity, much like personality and other individual characteristics, are supposed to 
substantially influence labour market outcomes and thus inequality. Ethnic identity is whatever 
makes individuals the same or different in comparison to other ethnic groups. It may also 
encompass a network of strong beliefs, values, and what people hold dear. Ethnic identity surfaces 
                                                                                                                                                                  
28 Another extension would be the self-selection of migrants who decide to return to their home countries, or to third 
countries. See e.g. Borjas (1989), Constant and Massey (2003), Dustmann (2003), and Galor and Stark (1991). 
29 Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987b).   28
and becomes a strong part of the migrants’ persona when they arrive in a host country that is 
dominated by a different ethnicity or culture. 
   There is a growing and related literature studying the evolution of culture and ethnic identity 
and its role for economic outcomes. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2006) deal with the mixed impact of culture. Kahanec (2007) investigates how the interaction of 
social relationships and ethnicity drive ethnic competition and specialization in the labour market. 
Theories of ethnic identity (Kuran, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Darity, Mason, and Stewart, 
2006; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Chiswick, 2006; Battu, Mwale and Zenou, 2007) and 
empirical studies (Mason, 2004; Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2006a and 2006b; Bisin, 
Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou, forthcoming; Nekby and Rödin, 2007) provide a better 
understanding of societal and economic behaviour.  
We follow Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2006a) to define ethnic identity as the 
balance between the commitment to or self-identification with the culture and society of the origin 
and host countries. We conjecture that a migrant who arrives in the host country moves along a 
plane formed by two axes representing commitment to the home and host countries. On the 
horizontal axis we measure commitment to and self-identification with the country of origin, and on 
the vertical axis we measure commitment to and self-identification with the host country.  
Confronted with both cultures, which combination of commitments do migrants choose to 
uphold? The two-dimensional ethnosizer, a measure of the intensity of a person's ethnic identity, 
deals with this question and conceptualizes the position of migrants in the positive orthant of 
commitment combinations. As illustrated in Figure 16, the ethnosizer contains four measures or 
regimes of ethnic identity differentiated by the strength of cultural and social commitments. 
Assimilation (A) is a strong identification with the host culture and society, coupled with a firm 
conformity to the norms, values, and codes of conduct, and a weak identification with the ancestry; 
Integration (I) is achieved when an individual combines, incorporates, and exhibits both strong 
                                                                                                                                                                  
30 See Chiswick (1999) for a more general treatment of self-selection. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) provide evidence   29
dedication to the origin and commitment and conformity to the host society; Marginalization (M) is 
a weak dedication to or strong detachment from either the dominant culture or the culture of origin; 
and,  Separation (S) is an exclusive commitment to the culture of origin even after years of 
emigration, paired with weak involvement in the host culture and country realities. Starting at point 
(1,0), a migrant can undergo a more complicated journey through the various states, leaving 
separation towards integration, assimilation or marginalization, or remaining separated.  
The ethnosizer is constructed by using individual data with information on the following 
elements: language, culture, societal interaction, history of migration, and ethnic self-identification 
(Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2006a). We briefly summarize some recent findings about 
the effects of ethnic identity on economic behaviour.
31 Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann 
(2006b) deal with the probability to work, Zimmermann (2007) with earnings, and Constant, 
Roberts and Zimmermann (2007) with homeownership. All three papers use the German Socio-
economic Panel (GSOEP) and employ Probit (work probability, homeownership) and Tobit models 
(earnings). The two-dimensional ethnosizer is added to standard regressions to examine the 
particular contribution of ethnic identity. Consistently, it is found that ethnicity matters significantly 
for economic performance and that the findings are very robust with respect to the concrete model 
specification. To put it differently: The inclusion of the ethnosizer does not change the parameter 
estimates of the standard variables in any relevant way. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates of the 
ethnicity effects have a strong impact on economic behaviour. Assimilation and integration have a 
positive effect on economic performance, while separation and marginalization do not. 
As discussed above, the economic literature on assimilation considers economic 
assimilation, which suggests that immigrants may finally converge to the economic behaviour and 
performance of natives. The issue is the speed of this process. The ethnicity literature considers 
ethnic identity as cultural capital that may emerge and develop, but likely persists over time and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
inconsistent with the negative selection hypothesis hypothesized by Borjas (1987b).    
31 Constant and Zimmermann (2008) provide an overview of this research and present evidence that the measures of 
ethnic identity (the ethnosizer) are exogenous.   30
exhibits comparative advantages and disadvantages for the economic process. This approach may 
help to explain why different ethnic groups can be observed to exhibit very different positions in the 
distribution of income and why some stay at the lower tail of income distribution while others move 
up and close the gap vis-à-vis the natives. 
 
5. Conclusions and Further Research 
The analysis in this chapter suggests that skilled labour immigration has a large potential to reduce 
inequality in the receiving countries. An important channel is the rise in relative wages of the 
unskilled with respect to the wages of the skilled. Unskilled immigration seems to generally 
increase inequality, only under specific circumstances it may decrease it. Such an instance is, if 
migrant adaptation overcomes downgrading, immigrants may turn from low- to high-skilled 
workers.  
  But the relationship between inequality and the presence of immigrants in the economy is 
not trivial. Complementarities between skilled and unskilled (immigrant) labour and ethnic capital, 
or the role of skilled and unskilled immigrants in satisfying the taste for variety in the host economy 
may affect inequality in complex ways. One has to be aware also of the different institutional and 
social histories of immigration and inequality across countries. Immigrants differ across countries, 
not only in terms of ethnic origin but also in terms of educational attainment, ethnic identity and 
societal and economic aspirations.  
  The flow of labour migration depends on incentives, but also on inequality in the sending 
and receiving countries. The relative inequality in the source and destination countries affects the 
prospects of immigrants with different skill levels differently, and thus feeds into the selection of 
immigrants across destination countries. Many immigrants do not remain migrants forever. Some of 
them assimilate, some integrate, some return, and some remain trapped in different degrees of social 
and labour market exclusion. The dynamics of the allocation of immigrants across these states 
importantly affects their labour market position as well as that of the natives and thus inequality.   31
  With the rising excess demand for skilled labour worldwide, and the positive consequences 
of labour migration for allocative and distributional purposes, there is a large potential for an 
international policy regime of unrestricted temporary and circular skilled labour migration. Highly-
skilled workers could obtain a global green card to work in their country of choice depending on the 
availability of a work contract. This could contribute to global welfare and more equality, since 
such a temporary and circular migration regime makes the best use of scarce brains and ensures that 
both sending and receiving regions receive their share of the gains of migration.  
  This has to be made possible by further research in various areas: Given the complexity of 
the effects and causes that the relationship between migration and inequality involves, in the next 10 
years we should concentrate our research on the causal effects of migration on inequality in the host 
and sending countries as well as on world inequality. We understand already many parts of this link, 
but the big picture is unclear due to the lack of data. Some of the specific issues that need further 
attention include the (i) effects on sending countries generated by brain drain, the (ii) intertwined 
effects between immigration, immigration policy, attitudes towards immigrants, and immigrants 
labour market outcomes, and (iii) the interactions between immigrant assimilation, ethnic capital, 
and immigrants’ labour market outcomes.   32
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New World:     
  Australia  23.3  30.9 
  Canada
(e) 17.5  29.1 
  United States  11.8  46.2 
Western Europe     
  Austria
(a) 8.8  23.7 
  Belgium
(a) 8.2  29.3 
  Germany  8.9  31.7 
  Greece  7.0  32.3 
  Denmark  4.9  39.0 
  Finland  2.0  30.2 
  France
(c) 5.6  27.0 
  Ireland
(a) 4.0  28.9 
  Italy  2.6  36.4 
  Luxembourg
(a) 37.5  26.6 
  The Netherlands  4.3  27.0 
  Norway  4.3  27.0 
  Portugal
(a) 3.4  37.1 
  Spain  3.1  31.0 
  Sweden  5.3  25.7 
  Switzerland  19.9  30.9 
  United Kingdom  4.5  35.0 
Post-transition:    
  Czech Republic  2.3  27.3 
  Hungary  1.1  38.6 
  Poland  0.1  34.9 
  Slovakia  0.5  26.0 
Other OECD     
  Japan
(d) 1.2  31.9 
  Korea
(d) 0.3  37.2 
  Mexico
(b) 0.4  53.5 
Notes: Data on Gini coefficients are from the WIID 2007 database. 
Foreign population as a share of total population; the OECD.Stat 





(e) 1996. No 
data for Iceland, New Zealand, and Turkey.   39
Table 2. Labour market participation rates of natives, immigrants, and skill groups 
   EU25  AT  BE  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
Natives  56.49  58.62  56.66  58.09 66.28 51.89 63.26 53.65 48.32 59.07  45.29 47.42 76.17 56.88 78.45 61.07
Immigrants 10+  60.73  59.61  51.61  47.92 76.31 61.02 72.63 50.25 68.23 62.52  59.58 58.41 69.43 72.62 73.82 55.71
Immigrants  57.14  60.14  54.12  51.29 74.83 72.52 67.84 50.98 67.90 68.79  61.99 64.08 68.10 72.00 71.62 60.53
Education:                                                 
  High  81.00  77.00  80.01  73.61 83.18 80.70 81.16 75.22 80.22 81.76  75.75 76.33 86.77 84.04 88.56 89.94
  Medium  68.42  66.49  64.82  61.72 72.59 65.18 73.25 64.36 62.31 70.22  65.33 55.06 80.18 64.22 82.57 80.00
  Low  38.00  35.49  34.60  36.28 41.30 40.95 37.53 34.74 34.39 40.69  31.63 37.29 61.06 53.84 57.76 57.09
Notes: Own calculations using data from the EU Labour Force Survey for civilians over 14 years of age. The values for the EU cover all the 25 member states of the European 
Union in 2005 except for Malta for which no data is available. Immigrants denotes people who were not born in the respective country. Immigrants 10+ are those immigrants 
who have been in the respective country for at least 10 years. Natives are those born to mothers residing in the respective country. High level of education includes ISCED 5 
and 6 levels. ISCED 5 denotes first stage tertiary programmes having an educational content more advanced than those offered by secondary levels. They do not lead to the 
award of an advanced research qualification and must have a cumulative duration of at least two years. ISCED 6 denotes second stage tertiary education leading to an 
advanced research qualification and requiring original research contribution in the form of a thesis or dissertation. Medium level of education includes ISCED 3 and 4 levels, 
which denote education that typically begins at the end of full-time compulsory education and involves higher qualification and specialization than the ISCED 2 level. ISCED 
3 level education is often designed to provide direct access to ISCED 5. ISCED 4 serve to broaden the knowledge achieved in ISCED 3 but are not regarded as tertiary. Low 
level of education includes ISCED 0, 1, and 2 levels. These include pre-primary, primary, and lower secondary or second stage of primary education. The end of ISCED 2 
often coincides with the end of compulsory schooling where it exists. For further details see UNESCO (1997). 
 
Table 3. Unemployment rates of natives, immigrants, and skill groups 
   EU25  AT  BE  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
Natives  7.32  3.80  7.42  9.25  5.47  8.91  6.51  9.11  9.44  4.07  7.81  3.48  3.30  7.21  5.62  4.55 
Immigrants 10+  9.64  8.20  14.79  13.91 5.65  9.91  10.77 13.76 11.14 5.30  9.15  4.08  7.25  8.31  9.81  6.19 
Immigrants  10.81  9.70  16.47  16.45 9.35  11.01 14.54 15.97 10.35 6.20  11.27 5.41  8.52  9.11  12.03 7.64 
Education:                                                 
  High  4.42  2.29  4.78  5.03  5.04  6.62  3.31  6.54  7.79  2.47  6.52  3.43  2.29  6.50  4.17  2.54 
  Medium  7.67  4.11  8.40  10.22 5.38  8.59  7.35  9.13  11.99 4.02  7.56  3.90  3.33  8.19  6.01  5.16 
  Low  10.49  8.36  14.18  18.10 8.15  10.84 11.21 14.19 7.86  6.66  8.99  5.95  5.81  7.29  11.54 8.94 
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Table 4. Occupational attainment of natives, immigrants, and skill groups 
   EU25  AT  BE  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
Natives  39.02  38.18  45.58  45.12 46.05 32.79 43.86 39.95 33.14 38.41  39.38 46.85 48.25 24.41 44.65 40.73
Immigrants 10+  36.58  25.13  42.46  30.68 46.78 33.99 39.31 35.46 14.57 48.58  32.92 35.24 43.70 39.61 38.58 49.69
Immigrants  33.36  26.07  42.56  30.02 40.83 12.02 41.23 34.24 9.42  36.58  23.74 42.59 41.88 30.09 40.59 45.85
Education:                                                 
  High  80.15  77.65  77.64  78.20 85.88 65.98 82.93 80.21 81.72 70.53  87.41 95.74 86.30 88.20 87.62 77.79
  Medium  30.40  32.52  30.75  33.67 28.89 25.48 24.76 27.35 24.52 25.24  44.65 35.04 41.21 35.62 29.63 27.22
  Low  13.14  9.76  16.48  16.80 12.85 11.20 18.46 16.40 10.05 22.07  14.54 6.19  14.72 12.46 15.12 12.70
Notes: Percentages of individuals over 14 years of age with occupational attainment at least rank 3 of the ISCO88 classification (1: Legislators, senior officials, and managers; 2: 
Professionals; 3: Technicians and associated professionals). For details on the ISCO88 classification see ILO (1990). See also Table 2. 
 
Table 5. Educational attainment of natives and immigrants 
   EU25  AT  BE  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
Natives                                                 
  High  17.33  13.18  25.95  20.18 26.75 20.58 26.32 19.53 13.28 20.85  8.43  15.44 26.13 7.72  24.73 26.30
  Medium  41.03  27.82  39.68  25.14 28.63 62.33 33.53 42.81 54.95 45.73  60.44 32.92 33.18 80.83 21.78 13.97
  Low  41.64  59.00  34.37  54.68 44.62 17.09 40.16 37.65 31.77 33.41  31.13 51.64 40.69 11.45 53.49 59.73
Immigrants 10+                                                 
  High  19.88  12.47  20.69  16.20 34.66 25.78 24.02 16.07 16.57 33.60  12.33 19.68 23.02 22.06 24.07 31.62
  Medium  39.63  40.07  51.96  41.52 23.31 48.71 28.86 59.31 44.31 33.70  47.70 45.95 31.48 53.86 25.01 19.18
  Low  40.49  47.46  27.35  42.29 42.02 25.51 47.11 24.62 39.12 32.70  39.97 34.37 45.50 24.07 50.92 49.20
Immigrants                                                 
  High  21.94  14.18  22.94  17.36 33.86 21.33 21.80 18.06 13.72 39.79  11.72 27.51 23.28 18.83 28.50 27.70
  Medium  38.32  39.46  49.46  41.73 27.89 46.76 33.74 57.47 47.74 26.58  49.80 39.93 31.69 54.72 23.86 18.45
  Low  39.74  46.36  27.59  40.91 38.25 31.92 44.46 24.47 38.54 33.64  38.48 32.56 45.03 26.45 47.64 53.85
Notes: Percentages of individuals over 14 years of age with High, Medium, and Low educational attainment. See also Table 2. 
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Table 6. Immigrant adjustment and selection in Australia 








Months after arrival:  6 18  42  6  18  42  6 18  6  18 
Skill Stream:                     
  Business skills  61  84  88  10  3  1  54  80  8  0 
  Employer nomination scheme  95  99  98  1  3  2  99  100  0  0 
  Independent  88  91  93  25  9  4  89  92  8  7 
  Skilled Australia Sponsored  80  85  90  35  18  10  85  87  21  6 
Family Stream:                     
  Family  49  55  58  38  19  17  53  62  22  13 
  Humanitarian  48  58  67  85  52  33  18  32  71  43 
Notes: Participation and unemployment rates in percent for immigrants arriving to Australia through different selection streams; 6, 18, and 42 months after arrival. LSIA 1 
denotes Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia that arrived in Australia between September 1993 and August 1995 and were interviewed three times. LSIA 2 covers 
immigrants that arrived between September 1999 and August 2000, and were interviewed twice. Tables from the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact 
Sheet 14.   
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of share 
of foreign labour 
 
Notes: Data on Gini coefficients are from the WIID 2007 database. Foreign 
labour force as a share of total labour force; the OECD.Stat database. 1995-2004. 
Western European OECD members, see Table 1. 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of share 
of foreign labour with a locally weighted line plot. 
 
Notes: Western European OECD members, see Table 1, excluding Switzerland 
and Luxembourg. The dashed line represents a line plot of the nonparametric 
locally weighted regression of Gini values on the share of foreign labour. See 






   43
 












1 L Labour  44



















(a) Skilled  (b) Unskilled 
 




h w  
0
h w  
1
l w  45




























































h w  
2
h w  
1








l w  46
Figure 6. The effects of a rise in the relative wages of the low-skilled on the Gini coefficient by 
shares of skilled labour 
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Figure 8: The effects of immigration on the Gini coefficient by shares of skilled labour              




Figure 9: The effects of immigration on the Gini coefficient by shares of skilled labour              
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Figure 10: Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the 
share of labour force with upper secondary or higher education 
 
Notes: OECD members except for Iceland. Data on Gini coefficients are from the 
WIID 2007 database. Data on the shares of labour force with given education are 
from the OECD Compendium. 1992-2003. 
 
 
Figure 11: Scatter plot of the Gini coefficient as a function of the 
share of labour force with post-secondary or higher education 
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Figure 12: Line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted 
regression of the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of 
labour force with upper secondary or higher education 
 
Notes: OECD members except for Iceland. Data sources see Figure 10. 1992-
2003. 
 
Figure 13: Line plot of the nonparametric locally weighted 
regression of  the Gini coefficient as a function of the share of 
labour force with post-secondary or higher education.  
 
Notes: OECD members except for Iceland and Mexico. Data sources see 
Figure 10. 1992-2003. 
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Figure 15. Inequality as a determinant of the migration decision 
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Figure 16. The two-dimensional non-negative ethnosizer 
 
 
   Note: See Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2006a). 
(1, 0) 
Commitment to  
Host Country 
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Appendix: Gini Coefficient and Immigration 
 
Consider an economy of size 1 with L low-skilled and  1 SL = −  high-skilled workers earning 
wages  l w  and  h w , respectively, as in the main text. We denote  lh ww θ =  and normalize the total 
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Proposition 1 
For any  [ ] 0,1 L∈  and any given  [ ] 0,1 θ ∈ ,  () 0 dG L dL
>
<




. For any 
[] 0,1 θ ∈  and any given  [ ] 0,1 L∈ ,  0 / ) ( < θ d L dG . 
Proof:  













 holding L constant and 












 holding θ  constant. We immediately see that 
( ) 0 dG L dθ < , since the denominator is positive,  0 L >  and  10 L− < . Similarly, the sign of   
( ) dG L dL is determined by the sign of  ( ) ( ) 121 LL θ −−− . This is in fact a quadratic formula with 
roots  () 11 θ +  and  () 11 θ − . Only the first one falls into the admissible interval of L. We can   53
easily see that  ( ) ( ) 121 LL θ −−−  is strictly positive for  ( )) 0,1 1 L θ ⎡ ∈+ ⎣  and strictly negative for 
( ) (11 , 1 L θ ⎤ ∈+ ⎦ .■  
  




=−  where  0 ρ > .  
 
Proposition 2 
For  () )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ⎡ ∈+ ⎣  the Gini coefficient equals 
  ()

















For  () (
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ⎤ ∈+ ⎦  the Gini coefficient equals  ( ) GL − .  
If  1 ρ ≥ ,  ( ) 0 dG L dL >  for any  ( ) 0,1 L∈ .  
For 01 ρ <<  and  ( ) 0,1 L∈ , there exist  ( ) ( )
11 1 1 1 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  and  () ()
21 1 1 1 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+, 
such that  () 0 dG L dL >  for  ( )
12 , LL L ∈ ,  ( ) 0 dG L dL <  for  ( )
12 0,1 , LL L ⎡⎤ ∈− ⎣⎦  and 
( ) 0 dG L dL =  for  { }
12 , L LL ∈ . Also, 
1*2 LLL < < , where  ( )
*1 1 1 1 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  
 
Proof: 




=− ,  ( ) ( )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ implies  1 lh ww θ αα = < , that is, high-





















 for  [] 1 , L ∈ λ .    54
Similarly as above we integrate the Lorenz curve over  [ ] 0,1 λ∈  and substitute for θ  to obtain 
()
















 to depict the Gini coefficient in this case and 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () ()
22 22 2 2 1
2
11 1 1 2 1
11
L LL L L L LL dG L
dL LL L L








 If  () ()
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ ,  1 lh ww θ αα = >  and high-skilled workers earn less than 














 for  [] L , 0 ∈ λ  and 













 for  [ ] 1 , L ∈ λ .  
Integrating the Lorenz curve over  [ ] 0,1 λ∈  we obtain that the Gini coefficient in this case is   
( ) GL − .  ( )
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  is the case of perfect equality. 
 For  1 ρ ≥  obviously from the expression for  ( ) dG L dL  it is positive for any  ( ) 0,1 L∈ .  
 For  0 1 ρ << , first note that  ( ) GL and  ( ) dG L dL are continuous functions for  ( ) 0,1 L∈ . 
Observe as well that  ( ) 0 GL→  for  1 L →  or  0 L →  and substituting  ()
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+  into 
( ) GL above yields  ( ) ( )
11 11 10 G
ρρ αα
−− + = . To see the former, note that 
()




















 and  
()




















, where we made use of 0 1 ρ << .  
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Furthermore,  () dG L dL →− ∞ whenever  1 L →  or  0 L →  and substitution yields 
() 0 dG L dL >  at  ()
11 11 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+ . In fact,  ( ) dG L dL ρ = .
32 These properties imply that 
there exists at least one minimum of  ( ) GL on the interval  ( ) ( )
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  and at least 
one maximum on the interval  ( ) ( )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+, where  ( ) 0 dG L dL = .  
  To show the uniqueness of each and the maxima of  ( ) dG L dL, consider the second 
derivative of  ( ) GL. Assume for the moment that  1 α = ; we extend the argument to the case where 
1 α >  below. First note that  
() () () ()
() () ()




12 1 2 2
11
LL dGL









=− − − + − + −
−− + −
. 














  is unambiguously positive for 0 1 ρ < <  and 
( ) 0,1 L∈ , the sign of the second derivative is the same as the sign of   
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 2 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ −− − + − + − .        ( A 1 )  
















+ − − −
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) 2 2 (
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L L L . Also, since  22 0 L ρ + −< and  1 ) 1 /( < − L L  we 
can write  
1
21






ρρ ρ ρ ρ
−
− ⎛⎞ −+ + −≤ −+ + −= ≤ ⎜⎟ −− − ⎝⎠
. This result and that 
0 ) 1 ( < − − L L
ρ  imply  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 2 0 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ −− − + − + − >  for 01 ρ <<   and 
                                                 
32 This result involves tedious algebra. One can show this by evaluating  ( ) dG L dL  at 
* L , simplifying it, and 
realizing that  () () ( ) 1, 1 dG L dL f αρ ρ =+ −  where the term  ( ) ,1 f αρ= .   56
( ) 0,0.5 L∈ . Similarly, rewriting A1 as  () ( )
1
1






− ⎛⎞ − ⎛⎞ −− −+ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 one can 
show that  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 2 0 LL L L LL
ρ ρ ρρ −− − + − + − <  for 0 1 ρ < <  and  ( ) 0.5,1 L∈ . 
 That 
22 () / 0 dGL d L>  (and thus  ( ) GL is strictly convex) for any  ( ) 0,0.5 L∈  and 
22 () / 0 dGL d L<  (and thus  ( ) GL is strictly concave) for any  ( ) 0.5,1 L∈ ,  ( ) 0 dG L dL <  for  1 L →  
or  0 L →  and  ( ) 0 dG L dL >  for  ( )
11 11 10 . 5 L
ρρ αα
−− =+ = , and the continuity of  ( ) dG L dL for 
( ) 0,1 L∈  imply the desired uniqueness of the extrema and the properties of  ( ) dG L dL for  1 α = . 
  To extend the argument to the case where  1 α > , note that for  ( ) 0 dG L dL =  to have at 
most two solutions within  ( ) 0,1 L∈ , it suffices to show that 
22 () / 0 dGL d L=  has at most one 
solution. Note as well that 
  () ()
()
() ) 2 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 (






ρ α ρ α
α α
ρ α ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
+ + − − + + − −
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ρ
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L
L
L L L L L L L L L . 
Thus, we need to show that  




















L L H   
has at most one solution within  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L  for  1 > α  and  1 0 < < ρ . For this to be true it suffices that 
) (L H  is monotonous for  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L , that is, for LL ′ >  it must be that  ( ) ( ) HL HL ′ > . Consider 
L L ′ > . Then 
11
2( 2 2 ) 2 ( 2 2 )








′ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ′′ −+ +− > −+ +− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ′ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, which one can rewrite as 
11
1 2( ) (2 2) (2 2) 0







− ⎛⎞ ′ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ′′ ⎜⎟ −+ + −− + − > ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ′ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
.     (A2)   57
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−− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ +−− +− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
        ( A 3 )  
is positive. If A3 is negative, we already know that A2 holds for  1 = α . Since 
1 − ρ α  is decreasing  
for (1, ) α ∈∞  a negative A3 and the fact that A2 holds for  1 = α  imply that A2 holds for a negative 
A3 as well.  
 Therefore,  given  their  continuity, 
22 () / 0 dGL d L=  has at most one and   ( ) 0 dG L dL =  at 
most two solutions and thus  ( ) GL has at most two interior extrema within  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ L . We already 
know that there exists at least one minimum of  ( ) GL on  ( ) ( )
11 11 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  and at least one 
maximum on  ( ) ( )
11 11 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+. Therefore, these extrema are unique and we can denote 
( ) ( )
11 1 1 1 0, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+  the minimum and  ( ) ( )
21 1 1 1 1, 1 L
ρρ αα
−− ∈+ the maximum. Clearly, it 
also follows that  
1*2 LLL <<, where  ( )
*1 1 1 1 1 L
ρ ρ αα
−− =+ . ■ 